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Theory and Psychology 
 
Unravelling Social Constructionism 
 
There can be little doubt that the post-modern theorization of language has 
had a significant impact within social psychology. Most obviously, perhaps, 
it has provided the theoretical foundations for discursive or social 
constructionist research - an area of rapidly expanding influence, not just 
within social psychology, but across virtually all of the human and social 
sciences.  In many academic circles today it is no longer contentious to 
suggest that all manner of objects and phenomena are 'socially constructed', 
accomplished in the hurly-burly of ordinary, everyday interactions (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992; Gergen, 1991; Harré & Gillett, 1994; Sampson, 1993). 
Such statements are now quite common-place. And yet, in Britain at least, 
the so-called 'turn to language' has fuelled the development of a new set of 
divisions or rifts, not just between social constructionists and 'mainstream' 
social psychologists but, more significantly perhaps, between 
constructionists themselves. There are now signs that a number of 
commentators who are, in some sense, quite sympathetic to constructionist 
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arguments, are becoming increasingly uneasy about their broader 
implications. As well as raising questions about the truth status of many 
previously taken for granted objects and events, a thorough-going 
constructionism is seen by them as both theoretically parasitic and politically 
paralysing (Gill, 1995; Nightingale and Cromby, 1999; Soper, 1991).   
 
     In this paper I would like to do three things. First of all I would like to 
provide a brief outline of how our common sense understandings of the 
relationship between representation and reality have been thrown into 
question by a number of post-structuralist arguments. Having done so I 
would then like to focus upon the uptake of these ideas within the social 
sciences, paying particular attention to what I see as some pervasive 
misunderstandings. In an attempt to help clarify some of these confusions, I 
will be drawing upon a conceptual distinction made by Derek Edwards 
between, what he calls, the ontological and epistemic senses of social 
construction (Edwards, 1997). Finally, at the very end of the paper, I will 
look very briefly at the implications of this distinction for social 
constructionism's reputation as a radical theoretical approach. 
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Truth in Trouble: Psychology's turn to language 
 
It is now widely understood that the 'turn to language' has prompted a major 
reconsideration of some of the most central tenets of Western philosophy. 
The work of theorists such as Baudrillard (1983), Derrida (1973) and 
Lyotard (1984) is said by many to have undermined our confidence in the 
twin notions of Truth and Reality (Burr, 1995; Gergen, 1991). In particular, 
it is thought to have disturbed our understanding of relationship between 
representation and reality; throwing into radical doubt the assumption that 
language maps on to reality in a fairly straight-forward manner. 
 
     However, if we take the time to look at the history of philosophy, we will 
see that the picture is much more complicated. Far from being an isolated 
incident, these current disagreements appear as just the latest in a long line 
of similar intellectual battles. According to Gergen (1985), the last few 
hundred years have witnessed a recurring epistemological debate, between 
those who see knowledge as somehow grounded in reality (e.g. Locke and 
Hume) and those who see it as, in part at least, a product of human mental 
functioning (e.g. Spinoza, Kant and Nietzsche). Social constructionism has 
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done less, it seems, to rattle existing philosophic certainties1, than it has to 
ruffle the feathers of contemporary common sense2. 
 
     All the same, it is important to take account of this common sense view 
(not least because it also represents the position from which most 
psychologists work). Common sense assumes that we have the 'real world' 
on the one hand, with all its distinctive qualities and then, on the other, we 
have accounts or descriptions of that world. Here, representations are just 
what they say they are; re-presentations or copies of something original. 
This is not to say, of course, that people always assume representations to be 
good, faithful or accurate. They know very well that representations can vary 
in terms of their fidelity. A photograph, for instance, is generally assumed to 
be an extremely good representation of the real (‘the camera never lies’ - 
although see Barthes, 1978; Sontag, 1978), whereas a four year old's 
drawing of their mother is likely, by comparison, to be thought of as a 
somewhat inferior reproduction. Nevertheless, at the very heart of our 
common sense understanding is the assumption that reality is both prior to 
and independent of representation. 
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     The challenge to this assumption (i.e. the turn to language) has its roots in 
a number of different disciplines including anthropology (Geertz, 1973; 
1983), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), linguistics (Derrida, 1973; 
Saussure, 1974), the philosophy of language (Austin, 1962; Wittgenstein, 
1953), semiology (Barthes, 1973) and the social studies of science (Latour 
and Woolgar, 1986; Woolgar, 1993) (see Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Gergen, 1991; Potter, 1996; Potter and Wetherell, 1987 for general 
reviews). What emerged in common was the view that the 'correspondence' 
or 'mirror' model of language was inadequate. It was argued that, far from 
there being some kind of straight-forward link between words and the world, 
the relationship between the 'signifier' and the 'signified' was arbitrary. As 
they saw it, language doesn't function to provide so many labels for objects 
and events already existing 'out there' in the world. Rather, in a move which 
turns the popular understanding completely on its head, they made 
representation the prior term. Language, they claimed, is productive rather 
than (merely) reflective. ‘Reality’ isn't so much mirrored in talk and texts as 
actually constituted by them. Discourse, said Foucault (1972) in an often 
quoted phrase, constructs the objects of which it speaks. 
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     As a teacher of social constructionist ideas it is easy to appreciate the 
apparent radicalism of such arguments. Students new to social 
constructionism often respond to my opening lectures by saying things like: 
‘Are you seriously trying to suggest that trees and houses, the stars in the 
sky, my great uncle Roger are not real?’ and ‘Are you trying to tell me that 
everything is just made up of talk?’ They think it perfectly obvious that the 
world contains a whole range of different objects and artefacts that are made 
of more solid stuff than words. They feel absolutely sure that, say, 
mountains exist irrespective of what we call them and that if, for some 
strange reason, we were to deny the existence of mountains - if we were to 
strike the word from all the world’s languages - they would still be there for 
us to admire, to ski on and to fall off. 
 
     However, this kind of reaction to social constructionist arguments is by 
no means restricted to relatively naive student audiences. Indeed, very 
similar kinds of objections have also been raised within the academy. For 
example, in a piece by Ben Bradley (Bradley, 1998), he complains that 
whilst language has taken up a position within the centre-stage of social 
psychological enquiry, it is treated by some social constructionists as the 
only reality there is. He states: 
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Talk about the mind is viewed as an artefact of cultural forces, an 
epiphenomenon shaped by the conventions of discourse. Discourse is 
real.  Everything else is relative to discourse. So subjective reality, 
personal experience and mind is not real (pg 68). 
 
     A similar point is made earlier in the same volume by none other than 
Edward Sampson - in which he accuses some social constructionists of 
denying the materiality of the body - which also stands as a leitmotif in 
David Nightingale and John Cromby's book Social Constructionist 
Psychology' (Nightingale and Cromby, 1999).  
 
     There can be little doubt that Foucault's statement as well as Jacques 
Derrida's equally famous claim that ‘there is nothing outside of the text’ 
(1976: 158) have fanned the flames of these concerns, insofar as they are so 
easily taken to imply that the world is purely textual. However, the main aim 
of this paper is to demonstrate that this is a misreading and that the 
complaints made by the likes of Bradley, Nightingale and Cromby rest upon 
a central confusion between or conflation of two quite distinct senses of 
social construction. 
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Dividing Constructionism: Ontological and Epistemic  
 
In recent years there have been a number of academic commentators who 
have suggested that social constructionism is not a unitary paradigm and that 
differently nuanced forms exist side by side. Such has been claimed, for 
example, by Kurt Danziger (1997), Ian Hacking (1998) and Ian Burkitt 
(1998; 1999). However, the particular distinction to which I want to turn 
comes from the work of Derek Edwards (Edwards, 1997). In the context of a 
more general discussion about the relationship between cultural and 
discursive psychology, Edwards draws a line between what he terms the 
ontological and epistemic senses of social construction.  He says: 
 
In much of cultural psychology, mind is ‘socially constructed’ 
ontologically... In other words, mind is real for the theorist and 
analyst, and the analytic task is to explain how it is built within a real 
world of cultural settings and practices. In discursive psychology, the 
major sense of ‘social construction’ is epistemic; it is about the 
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constructive nature of descriptions, rather than of the entities that 
(according to descriptions) exist beyond them. (pgs 47-8). 
 
     Perhaps the first thing to say about this quotation is that I disagree with 
Edwards over his disciplinary ring-fencing. As far as I can see, there is 
plenty of evidence of both senses of social construction within the writings 
of discursive psychologists, including Edwards’ own work. Nevertheless, if 
we focus upon the particular sense with which he prefers to align himself, 
we should note that epistemic social construction orientates around the 
notion that any attempt to describe the nature of the world is subject to the 
rules of discourse. It points to the fact that as soon as we begin to think or 
talk about the world, we necessarily begin to represent (see also Edwards et 
al, 1995). Talk involves the creation or construction of particular accounts or 
stories of what the world is like. 
 
     As far as I can see, it is from this particular sense that we get the claim 
that there is no way of apprehending the world outside of language; that we 
do not see reality for what it is and then translate it into words. It is from an 
epistemic point of view that we can see language operating as the medium 
through which we come to understand or know the world. This is because, 
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epistemologically speaking, reality cannot exist outside of discourse, waiting 
for fair representation. Instead, it is the product of discourse, both the subject 
and the result of what talk is all about. 
 
     The mistake that critics such as Bradley make is to assume that when 
social constructionists state that ‘there is nothing outside of the text’, they 
are making an ontological rather than an epistemological pronouncement; 
that is, a claim about what the world is actually like. However, there are at 
least two good reasons for doubting this interpretation. First of all, to say 
such a thing would appear to invite a logical contradiction, for as Jonathan 
Potter (1997) has pointed out, to claim that there really is nothing outside of 
talk implies that one can somehow know that to be the case, absolutely and 
for all time - which is precisely the assumption that the epistemic sense of 
social constructionism sets out to disturb. The second reason for doubt is in 
many ways more empirically based. For as Steve Woolgar has suggested 
(Woolgar, 1983), it is actually very difficult to find occasions where social 
constructionists have explicitly denied the existence of an extra-discursive 
realm. More often or not it is an opinion that others (i.e. realists) have 
attributed to them. 
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     Consider the following four extracts that I have taken from two of the 
publications which, within social psychology at least, are amongst the most 
frequently cited with regard to these kinds of controversies: Derek Edwards' 
book Discourse and Cognition and Jonathan Potter's Representing Reality. 
 
1. Descriptions are not just about something but they are also doing 
something; that is, they are not merely representing some facet of the 
world, they are also involved in that world in some practical way 
(Potter, 1996, pg. 47 - emphasis altered). 
 
2. Emotion categories are not graspable merely as individual feelings or 
expressions... They are discursive phenomena and need to be studied 
as such, as part of how talk performs social actions (Edwards, 1997, 
pg. 187 - emphasis added). 
 
3. It is our texts, our discourses, our descriptive practices, that bring their 
objects into being. At least, they bring them into being as the objects 
of our understanding (Edwards, 1997, pg. 45 - emphasis added). 
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4. Descriptions and accounts construct the world, or at least versions of 
the world (Potter, 1996; pg. 97 - emphasis altered). 
 
     If we look carefully at these four quotations, we should see that neither 
author denies the existence of a world outside of talk. In the first extract, for 
example, Potter doesn't deny that discourse is about something, nor does he 
suggest that descriptions cannot have their referents. Similarly, in his 
analyses of emotion talk, Derek Edwards does not attempt to deny the reality 
of feelings like 'jealousy', 'guilt' and 'anger'. As we can see in Extract 2, what 
he is suggesting is that when people talk about emotions they are usually 
doing a lot more than simply reporting upon how they feel inside.   
 
     The idea that social constructionists are denying the existence of 
emotions and feelings is one that trades upon a familiar but spurious 
bifurcation between representation and reality. For example, if we look back 
at the quotation from Bradley, we will see it implied that if subjective 
experiences are the products of discourse, then they cannot, in fact, be real. 
It seems to me that there is something deeply ironic about this line of 
reasoning, as social constructionists are hardly the ones proposing that there 
is no reality to discursive objects. Indeed their point is usually the reverse. In 
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Edwards' work, for example, the way that people talk about emotions is seen 
as constitutive of how we understand ourselves as emotional beings. In other 
words, whether people are 'angry', 'irritated', 'jealous' or 'anxious' is, in the 
ontological sense of construction, a consequence of the terms we apply to 
ourselves.  
 
     What is more, some of the most celebrated pieces of constructionist work 
have drawn specific attention to the onto-formative (Connell, 1995; Kosik, 
1976) capacities of language. Work such as Foucault's (1981) The History of 
Sexuality, Phillipe Aries' (1962) Centuries of Childhood and Benedict 
Anderson's (1983) Imagined Communities have all shown how discourse can 
bring into being a whole range of different phenomena that are every bit as 
'real' as trees and houses. In addition, they have helped us to understand that 
there is no clear dividing line between words and the world or between the 
material and the symbolic. 
 
     Many critical realists would tend to see something like the theft of a car, 
for example, as consisting of two different orders of 'reality'; the car, and its 
removal, would be seen as belonging to the material realm whereas the act 
of ‘theft’ would be classified as belonging to the symbolic order (that is, it 
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would be seen as a constructed reality; a consequence of reading the event 
through a particular moral-judicial framework - see Foucault, 1977). Yet, if 
we think about it, the fact that a perpetrator's status as a ‘thief’ is constructed 
via a set of texts or discourses - including the magistrate's pronouncement 
and the resulting criminal 'record' - does little to diminish the damaging 
material effects of being so described. Those texts alone might well cost the 
offender a good deal of time and money.  Similarly, a car is much more than 
just a physical hunk of machinery. For as Barthes (1973) has ably 
demonstrated, cars have a strong mythical quality about them; they are 
important symbols of status and power. Indeed, it is precisely this quality of 
cars, as objects of desire, that renders them so vulnerable to being stolen in 
the first place. We should see that the realms of the material and the 
symbolic are inextricably bound up with one another and that it is a pretty 
futile task to try to tease them apart. 
Conclusions 
 
In closing, I should repeat that the main point of this paper is to show that 
some of the arguments surrounding social constructionism are based upon a 
central misunderstanding. Contrary to the view of some critical realists, most 
social constructionists do not see language as the only reality. When they 
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travel to conferences or go on holiday, for example, they consult their map 
books just like everybody else. They do not suppose that, say, Nottingham 
appears in the middle of the M1 motorway because it says so on the page 
and neither do they imagine that it somehow springs into existence at the 
moment it is mentioned. The way that constructionism upsets our common 
sense understandings is much more subtle than this.  Instead, a 
constructionist might point out that Nottingham is a city by virtue of a text 
(that is, by royal decree) and that it's boundaries - where it begins and ends - 
are also a matter for negotiation and agreement. The argument is not, 
therefore, that Nottingham doesn't really exist, but that it does so as a 
socially constructed reality. 
 
     My other main conclusion is that, when kept apart like this, neither the 
epistemic nor the ontological sense of social construction looks anything like 
as contentious as when they are both mixed up together. Most of us are able 
to accept, I think, that descriptions are seldom neutral; that they are typically 
purpose-built for the contexts in which they make their appearance. 
Likewise, I think that most people are able to appreciate how discourses can 
give rise to forms of social life, such as gender, class and national identity. 
The irony is, however, that the conflation or confusion of these two different 
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senses of social construction has not only fuelled countless academic 
arguments but, as I think we can detect in the third and fourth quotations 
above, it has often been exploited for rhetorical effect. What this means, of 
course, is that in unravelling social constructionism, not only do we take 
some of the heat out of many a recent academic exchange, but we may also 
prompt a cooling down of interest in social constructionism as a whole.   
 
Notes: 
 
1. In actual fact, in this article Gergen (1985) does present social 
constructionism as making a distinctive philosophical contribution - 
one of transcending the impasse between empiricist and rationalist (or, 
in his words, exogenic and endogenic) perspectives. 
 
2. This is not to suggest, of course, that the realms of philosophy and 
common sense are in any way sealed off from one another. Indeed, it 
would seem that what Gergen (1985) calls the ‘exogenic’ perspective 
dominates both the metatheory of science and our common sense view 
of knowledge. 
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